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Shipping Retaliations Under
United States and International Law
Dennis James Burnett*
Each nation has the right to control its domestic and foreign com-
merce. 1 But the commerce of any nation becomes less its exclusive con-
cern as commercial relationships with other nations grow. The growth of
multi-national corporations and the increase of foreign direct invest-
ments make the acts of any nation affecting its domestic commerce have
greater ramifications on the economic interests of other nations. The
effects are even greater in foreign commerce. Any tendency towards
chauvinism in foreign commerce has a direct impact on the economies
of two or more nations. As protective devices and artificial diversions of
trade multiply and become more sophisticated, the number of conflicts
between economic interests is bound to increase. The procedures for re-
solving these conflicts will be put to greater tests. An industry which has
been particularly subject to these types of conflicts is the ocean liner in-
dustry. The past and present means of resolving trade carriage conflicts
used by the United States are therefore worthy of examination for as-
certaining their applicability to other areas of commerce.
Most of the world trade moves on ocean vessels. 2 Importing and ex-
porting nations are dependent upon the services offered by the ocean
liner industries for efficient and reliable movement of their goods and
the maintenance of international commercial ties. It is also important for
nationals at both ends of a trade route to be involved in the carriage of
their trade because such participation reduces the level of reliance a na-
tion has on the services of the ocean liners of another nation and stems a
large drain on currency. As an example, Great Britain maintained a posi-
tive balance of payments position for years even though imports were
greater than exports because her merchant marine trade income domi-
nated her import and export markets. 3
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1 Some authors assert the existence of jus communicationis, but it is not the prevailing
doctrine. See 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §10, at 181 (1965);
and, infra note 35 and accompanying text.
2 For example, in the U.S. foreign trade, vessels carried 58.71% of the exports and
66.29% of the imports from January 1, 1975, to September 31, 1975. U. S. Bureau of Census,
Highlights of the U. S. Export and Import Trade, REPORT FT99 (Sept. 1975).
3 [, T ]he British Government described as 'Great Britain's invisible exports, 'viz,
the return to Great Britain of the receipts from the operation of the British owned merchant
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Many nations, including the United States, have therefore endeav-
ored to establish and promote their own merchant marines. 4 Such efforts
often conflict with interests of other nations. The most pernicious of
these promotional acts blatantly discriminate against the national flag
vessels of other countries and adversely affect the movement of goods in
international trade. When such acts occur, international conflicts of in-
terest result.
Absent any special compact for the resolution of their differences,
nations have the right to resort to self-help5 since the law of nations lacks
the positive international sanctions which render the same self-help
measures unlawful under municipal codes. 6 "Each state is also entitled
to judge for itself, what are the nature and extent of the injuries which
would justify such means of redress."' 7 The means of self-help or redress
available to nations are referred to as retorsions, retaliations, and re-
prisals.
The word retorsion is derived from retorquere signifying to twist or
turn back.8 Retorsions can be divided into two sorts, retorsio juris or re-
torsio de droit, and retorsio facti. 9 A retorsio juris is a lawful measure taken
in compensation for a violation of comity, 10 a violation of an imperfect
obligation, or a hostile policy. 1 Such measures are implementations of
the right of the state to regulate its domestic and foreign commerce.1 2 A
retorsio facti, on the other hand, is a positive measure inflicted upon an
offending state for violations of internationally recognized rights 13 for
the purpose of securing compensation or acting as a deterrent. 14 A re-
marine, of a sum sufficiently great to not only compensate for the excess of Britain's ex-
ports over imports, but to insure an additional balance in favor of Britain, sufficiently
large to have always forced the flow of gold from other nations to Britain..." Memoran-
dum from R.A. Dean, General Counsel, United States Shipping Board, SENATE COMM.
ON COMMERCE, PROMOTION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE AMERICAN MERCHANT
MARINE, S. REP. No. 573, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 6, 7 (1920).
4 See generally, Shipping Act, 1916, 46 U.S.C. §801 (1970); Merchant Marine Act,
1920, 46 U.S.C. § 861 (1970); Merchant Marine Act, 1928, 46 U.S.C. §891 (1970); Intercoastal
Shipping Act, 1933, 46 U.S.C. § 843 (1970); Merchant Marine Act, 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1101
(1970); Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946, 46 U.S.C. App. § 1735 (1970). See note 72 and ac-
companying text infra.
5,H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 309 (1889).
6 Constrained, of course, by the U.N. Charter and its prohibition of the use of armed
force. See, J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 288 (1954).
7 H. WHEATON, supra note 5, at 309.
8 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
BY THE UNITED STATES § 588, n. 3, (2d ed. 1945).
9 HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 470 (3d ed. 1893); H. TAYLOR, A TREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW § 435 (1901).
10 H. WHEATON, supra note 5, at 309.
:I H. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 470.
12 Id.
13 H. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 435.
14 2 J. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1907).
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torsio facti may therefore be an act which would otherwise be contrary to
international law. Is
Retaliation is another kind of self-help. The word retaliation is de-
rived from the Latin verb retaliare signifying the return of like for like. 16
It is a method for obtaining satisfaction by making another suffer pre-
cisely as much evil as he has done. 17 Under Roman law it was called lex
talionis; in the Bible, the taking of an eye for an eye. 18 The term retaliation
is properly used "only for that kind of retorsion in which the thing done
is the same as that complained of."' 19 Retaliation may properly be de-
scribed as a retorsion in kind. 20
Another measure of self-help is a reprisal. The technical meaning of
reprisal is a "taking in return.' 21 Reprisal may properly be "defined as
the taking possession, at sea or on land, of the ships or other property of
a foreign state or subject, with a view either to put pressure on that state
for the redress of a wrong alleged to have been done to it or by one of its
subjects, or to the application of such property as compensation for such
alleged wrong." 22
These etymologically based definitions do not, however seem to
conform to the usage of many authors. The majority of authors seem to
use the terms quite differently from their technical meanings. The term
retaliation is commonly used to encompass all measures of retorsion,
both facti and juris. 2 3 The term retorsion is normally restricted to meas-
15 2 C. HYDE supra note 8, § 588, called "vindictive" retaliation; H. WHEATON, supra
note 5 at 309.
16 2 C. HYDE, supra note 8, § 588 at 1658.
17 E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 399 (1817).
18 2 J. WESTLAKE, supra note 14, at 6.
19 Id.
20 2 C. HYDE, supra note 8, § 588 n. 3.
21 "Although the word reprisal and its equivalents in the Latin languages are . . . of
relatively modem origin, the conduct they were used to describe had a very early begin-
ning. Grotius was quick to discern the similarity between the law of reprisals of the seven-
teenth century and the custom of the Athenians known as androlepsia ... that custom per-
mitted the relatives of an Athenian murdered by a foreigner, if satisfaction were refused,
'to seize three fellow-countrymen of the murderer and hold them for judicial condemna-
tion to compensation, or even to the death penalty . . .' According to Gustave Glotz,
androlepsia was not a custom peculiar to the law of the Greeks, but prevailed also among the
Romans, as well as among the Ossetes, and was seen also in the early Irish law ... " 2C.
HYDE, supra note 8, § 589 n. 5.
22 J. WESTLAKE, supra note 14, at 7-8.
23 See generally C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 635 (4th ed. 1965); W. HALL,
A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 381 (4th ed. 1895); HALLECK, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 470 (3d ed. 1893); 2 C. HYDE, supra note 8, § 588; 7 J. MOORE, A DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1096 (1906); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §29
(H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952); 3 R. PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (1857); 1 G. SCHWARZENBE.RGER, A MANUAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 173 (4th ed. 1960); VEROROSS, VOLKERRECHT 425 (1964); H.
WHEATON, supra note 5, 308; Schoen, Zur Lehre von den volkerrechtlichen nichtkriegeri-
schen Mitteln der Selbsthilffe, 20 ZEITZCHRIFT FUR VOLKERRECHT 14 (1936); Tomu-
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ures which have been defined above as retorsio juris.24 Reprisal is gen-
erally used for measures employing armed force which have been de-
fined as retorsio facti. 25 While less technically correct, these commonly
used definitions have the advantage of being more consistent with
everyday usage. To avoid confusion, the term retorsion shall be used to
mean internationally legal measures taken in response to unfriendly or
damaging but nevertheless internationally legal measures of a foreign
state. Reprisals shall refer to measures which, though otherwise illegal,
are taken in response to internationally illegal acts of a foreign state. As
used herein, reprisal may or may not involve the use of armed force. The
term retaliation shall encompass both retorsions and reprisals. These
definitions are consistent with the case of Baranyai v. Yugoslavia26 which
held that the government of Yugoslavia could not repudiate a treaty ob-
ligation in response to an act which was unfriendly but which was not
contrary to any intemationally recognized right.27
A reprisal may not be legally employed as a retorsion. Since a re-
torsion is by definition a legal act, there are no international legal re-
straints upon theiir use. International law does, however, put restrictions
upon the use of reprisals. Reprisals may be taken only when (1) there has
been a breach of international law, (2) a request for redress has been
made and refused or met without success, 28 and (3) the measures taken
correspond to the wrong done.
29
These measures of self-help may be used to accomplish different
objectives. One of the oldest purposes of retaliations is to:
make another suffer precisely as much evil as he has done. Many have
explained that law as being founded in the strictest justice: -and
can we be surprised at their having proposed it to princes, since they
have presumed to make it a rule even for the deity himself? The ancients
called it the law of Rhadamanthus. The idea is wholely derived from the
obscure and false notion which represents evil as essentially and in its
own nature worthy of punishment .... 30
Retaliations are more, however, than mere attempts to punish evil acts.
Passive forms of retorsion by which the subjects of a foreign nation are
treated in the same manner as the subject of the retorting nation are "con-
schat, Repressalie und Retorsion, Zu einigen Aspekten ihrer innerstaatlichen Durchfzlrung, 33
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT
179 (1973).
24 See note 10, supra, and accompanying text.
25 See note 13, supra, and accompanying text.
26 7 Trib. Arb. Mixte 858 (1927).
27 Id. at 865.
28 "Remonstrance and refusal of satisfaction ought to proceed. citing opinion of
Thomas Jefferson, quoted in 3 F. WHARTON, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 318 at 85 (2d ed. 1887).
29 Nauliaa Case, 8 Trib. Arb. Mixte 409, 422-3 (1929); see J. STONE, supra note 6, at 289.
30 E. VATTEL, supra note 17, § 339; HALLECK, supra note 24, at 470.
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formable to justice and sound policy. No one can complain on receiving
the same treatment which he gives to others . . .. ,31 Retaliations therefore
work to balance out the detriments and to deny the initiator any artificial
advantages created by his acts. Retaliations may also be used to deter
future similar conduct, to obtain redress by persuading the other state to
abandon or cease its actions or policies, or to obtain satisfaction. 32 When
a nation uses its powers over its foreign and domestic commerce in a
manner detrimental to the interests of another nation, any resulting re-
taliations would most naturally be expressions of the other nation's
power over its foreign and domestic commerce.
The Constitution of the United States, in Article I, Section 8, Clause
3 vests the exercise of the powers of the United States over foreign and
domestic commerce in Congress. It provides that
Congress shall have Power ... to regulate commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States, ...
It is well recognized that the power of Congress over foreign commerce is
absolute.33 Participation in the foreign commerce of the United States
is a privilege granted by the sovereign which may be terminated, condi-
tioned, or limited. 34
These Congressional powers over foreign commerce naturally ex-
tend to shipping and enable Congress to retaliate against discrimina-
tions against United States vessels. As early as 1818, the United States
closed its ports to British vessels arriving from British colonies in retalia-
tion for the exclusion of American ships from the trades of those British
colonies. 35 Congress retained the powers of retaliation against shipping
discriminations in foreign commerce until the United States Shipping
Board Bureau (Shipping Board) was created by the Shipping Act of
1916.36 In creating the Shipping Board, Congress delegated certain of its
functions (with regard to the formulation of retaliatory legislation) to the
new Shipping Board and the President. Section 2 of the Shipping Act of
191637 states:
The board shall have power, and it shall be its duty whenever com-
plaint shall be made to it, to investigate the action of any foreign Gov-
ernment with respect to the privileges afforded and burdens imposed
upon vessels of the United States engaged in foreign trade whenever it
shall appear that the laws, regulations, or practices of any foreign Gov-
ernment operate in such a manner that vessels of the United States are
31 E. VATTEL, supra note 17, § 342.
32 J. STONE, supra note 6, at 289.
33 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
34 Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U. S. 48 (1933).
35 3 Stat. 432 (1818); 7 J. MOORE, supra note 24, at 106.
36 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1970).
37 46 U.S.C. § 825 (1970).
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not accorded equal privileges in foreign trade with vessels of such for-
eign countries or vessels of other foreign countries, whether in trade
to or from the ports of such foreign countries or in respect of the pas-
sage or transportation through such foreign country of passengers or
goods intended for shipment or transportation in such vessels of
the United States, either to or from ports of such foreign country
or to or from ports of other foreign countries. It shall be the duty of
the board to report the results of its investigation to the President with
its recommendations and the President is hereby authorized and em-
powered to secure by diplomatic action equal privileges for vessels of
the United States engaged in such foreign trade. And if by such diplo-
matic action the President shall be unable to secure such equal privi-
leges then the President shall advise Congress as to the facts and his
conclusions by a special message, if deemed important in the public
interest, in order that proper action may be taken thereon.
However, with the election of a new Congress, the intervention of
the First World War, and the excess of ships in the commercial trades, an
impatience with the procedures of section 26 of the Shipping Act of 1916
developed. When H.R. 10378, an Act to promote and establish the Mer-
chant Marine, was passed from the House of Representatives to the
Senate in 1919, hearings before the Committee on Commerce sparked an
idea which was to grow into section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act of
1920-38.38
A comment about the British orders in council during a discussion
of the ability of Great Britain to maintain her large Merchant Marine
was the first indication that a new procedure for shipping retaliations
might be desired.
Senator Chamberlain. May I interrupt just here to ask how Great
Britain is managing this whole system? Have they a minister of marine?
Mr. Rosseter. They have a ministry of shipping, and up to the early
days of January the ministry of shipping had apparently a very great
discretion in the affairs of British shipping; but at some diate in Jan-
uary, accurately not known to me, much of this power was taken from
the ministry of shipping and control returned to the so-called regular
lines, as distinguished from tramp steamers. Changes of this sort are
accomplished very expeditiously by an "order in council."
Senator Chamberlain. They have that great advantage of us and al-
ways will have, that an order in council, which is simply a decree of the
King, meets the situation at once, while we have to do it through the
Congress.
Mr. Rosseter. Yes, Senator, that is true.
Senator Chamberlain. Is not that a very great advantage to them?
Mr. Rosseter. It is. About the time I was negotiating with the min-
istry of shipping looking to a stabilizing of freight rates and recogni-
tion of certain mutual interests, negotiations were suddenly termi-
nated, and I was notified by one of the conference lines that certain
38 46 U.S.C. § 876 (1970).
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plans of their own would be put into effect in 48 hours. I had the dis-
tinct impression at the time that the British steamship companies had
decided it was a good time to swat an infant shipping industry. 39
It was not until the testimony of Mr. William I. Clark that the Com-
merce Committee began to formulate a delegation of retaliatory powers
with regard to shipping. 40 This testimony caused another senator to
ponder the legality of such delegations. 41 Finally, a proposal was made. 42
When H.R. 10378 was reported out of the Committee on Commerce
and submitted to the Senate as a whole, it contained for the-first time a
39 COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, HEARINGS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
AN AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 299, 300 (1919).
40 The Chairman. Let me ask you right there. Has the board of trade anything like legis-
lative powers? That is, as I understand it, it can do practically anything it thinks wise to
promote shipping unless it is prohibited by statute. How about that?
Mr. Clark. The English law is different from ours and more flexible in this respect. In
addition to the law they have what is known as the "order in council", and the "order in
council" may be likened to the cracker of the whip of English law, and just as a first-class
"mule-skinner" will be able to take his whip and fleck a fly from off his leaders with
great detriment to the fly and none to the leaders, so the British official with the "order in
council" is able to destroy the foreign competition without injury to British interests any-
where, while apparently actually conforming to the law. Id., at 1432.
41 Senator Chamberlain. Well, I have often wondered if there was any way in the world
in which the United States under its Constitution can adopt any regulations or can confer
any powers which would meet these constant orders in council, which may change every
24 hours to meet a good situation.
Mr. Clark. Senator Jones offered one in the Senate. It was accepted in the Committee
as a whole, and was voted out, however, in the Senate in connection with the railroad bill.
The point was this: It was about as near to a flexible law as you could provide in the United
States. In other words, they would be permitted to participate in the carriage so long as
they did not cut rates, but if they cut rates the American carriers would not be permitted to
carry the freight offered by the foreign carrier.
Senator Chamberlain. I have often thought that a power could be conferred upon the
Board enabling us to meet that order in council. It affects us not only in Canada, but in
America, everywhere.
The Chairman. Why could we not give power to the Shipping Board to pass regula-
tions to meet the situation started by the orders in council?
Senator Chamberlain. That is the only way we could protect ourselves.
Mr. Clark. If there were some way that we could devise a department somewhat simi-
lar to the British Board of Trade, it would be of great benefit to us. The British Board of
Trade protects British shipping in every way possible. That protection is always presumed
to be in the general British interests, and all matters of regulation are therefore worked out
in harmony with British commerce and British shipping, protective of both, and I have no
criticism of that. I think that it is a proper system. Some have accused me of disliking Great
Britain. On the contrary, I greatly admire them. I think they are the most remarkable com-
mercial nation on the face of the earth, because they have never had to be aroused to the
national interest; they have always been awake to that patriotic necessity; and they make
their laws to protect Great Britain against all the commerce and all the shipping of the
world, and that is as it should be.
Senator Chamberlain. And they can change it.
Mr. Clark. And whenever it does not fit the case it is waived in a measure. Id., at 1464.
42 The Chairman. Here is an idea I would like to see incorporated into law if we could do
it, and I want to suggest it for your consideration, to authorize the Shipping Board to make
such rules and regulations as may be necessary from time to time to conform our practices
and methods in connection with the merchant marine as nearly as may be to the English
laws and regulations, except where it is otherwise expressly provided by law, or make our
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section delegating retaliatory powers to the Shipping Board. The Com-
mittee stated:
Far-reaching power is placed in the Shipping Board to make and
control rules and regulations affecting shipping, and to meet foreign
competition. We must do something of this kind, if we would meet the
practices and methods of other countries. Through their orders in coun-
cil and other semi-legislative acts of administrative bodies they inter-
fere with and handicap our merchant marine in many different ways.
This must be met in a similar way .... 43
H.R. 10378 was passed by the Senate and sent to conference with
the House. When it emerged from conference and was passed, it had a
section delegating powers of commercial retaliation to the United States
Shipping Board Bureau.
Sec. 19. (1) The Board is authorized and directed in aid of the ac-
complishment of the purposes of this Act:
(b) to rmake rules and regulations affecting shipping in the foreign
trade not in conflict with law in order to adjust or meet general or spe-
cial conditions unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade, whether in
any particular trade or upon any particular route or in commerce gen-
erally, and which arise out of a result of foreign laws, rules, or regula-
tions, or from competitive methods or practices employed by owners,
operators, agents, or masters of vessels of a foreign country;44
*, These retaliatory powers, delegated to the United States Shipping
Board in 1920 were passed to the United States Maritime Commission in
1936,'4 to the Federal Maritime Board in 1950,46 and finally to the Federal
Maritime Commission [Commission ] in 1961. 4 7 In order to understand
regulations conform to those of our principle competitors, in any particular section or
route. That is in line with the idea you have there.
Mr. Clark. I think that is a very excellent suggestion, and it would serve to take care, in
that connection, of the question of difference in measurement of vessels, it offers a very
good substitute for board of trade regulatory power in those particulars.
The Chairman. Take care of everything that we did not especially provide by law. The
only question is whether we could do it under our form of government, whether we could
give that power or not to an administrative body. Under that they could not overnight do
like they do with these orders in council. They could meet these orders in council very
promptly.
Mr. Clark. They could do specific things without undue delay. I think that would be
very desirable legislation, in whatever form it might be devised, so as to conform to their
requirements of all law making authority. Id., at 1484.
43 S. REP. No. 573, supra note 3, at 5.
44 46 U.S.C. § 876 (1970).
4- Merchant Marine Act, 1936, Ch. 858, § 204(b), 49 Stat. 1987 (1936).
46 Reorganization Plan No. 21, 1950, § 104(3), 64 Stat. 1273 (1950), formerly, Ch. 858,
§204(b), 49 Stat. 1987 (1936).
47 Reorganization Plan No. 7,46 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1970),formerly, § 104(3), 64 Stat. 1273
(1950).
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the retaliatory powers delegated to the Commission, it is necessary to
closely examine section 19(1)(b) [section 19 1.
The Commission is authorized to make rules and regulations af-
fecting shipping in the foreign trade "in order to adjust or meet" gen-
eral or special conditions. Conditions can be adjusted or met by: (1)
achieving redress by elimination of the conditions; or, (2) balancing the
detriments by creating situations which nullify or neutralize the condi-
tions. The creation of new conditions indirectly acts to deter similar
actions by the same or different states. Clearly, Congress did not intend
section 19 to be used to secure compensation for damages done to the
United States because of the policies or practices of another state. The
Commission does not have the authority under section 19(1)(b) to
order the seizure of a foreign flag vessel to compensate for damages
caused by discrimination. 48 Nor was it the intent for section 19 to be
used to punish acts which the Commission would regard as evil or
immoral. Regulations under section 19 may therefore be issued to
achieve redress or to balance detriments.
The power to adjust or meet conditions also entails broad discretion
as to the choice of the kinds of retaliation which may be used. The Com-
mission is not limited to the use of the technical retaliation-the return
of like-kind. 49 It is the effect of the retaliation which is limited by section
19 and not the vehicle by which it is accomplished. That is not to say,
however, that the Commission is not constrained in the choice of acts
which it may use for the purpose of retaliation. Since section 19 is a dele-
gation of the Congressional power to regulate foreign commerce, any
action taken by the Commission under section 19 must be consistent
with the power to regulate commerce. For instance, the Commission
could not order the seizure of a vessel since such an action would be
beyond the power to regulate commerce, but it could prohibit the dis-
carge or picking up of any cargo by a foreign vessel in a U.S. port.50
The standard of "adjusting or meeting" general or specific condi-
tions imposed by section 19 also conforms with the requirement of in-
ternational law that reprisals be proportionate to the wrongful acts to
which they respond.51 Proportionality is easily met where the retalia-
tion is of a like-kind since no one can complain of being treated in the
same manner as others.5 2 The determination of proportionality does be-
come more difficult, however, when the retaliation is not of like-kind.5 3
Under international law, there is no way of ascertaining the excessive-
48 The powers of reprisal are limited to the delegation of power for the regulation of
foreign commerce. 46 U.S.C. § 876 (1970).
49 See text accompanying note 16, supra.
50 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9*Wheat.) 1, 82 (1824).
51 See text accompanying note 3, supra.
52 See text accompanying note 32, supra.
53 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 24, at 173.
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ness of a reprisal short of a special arbitration s4 or a special procedure
such as set forth in Article XXIII of GATT.5 5 If one nation believes another
nation's reprisal is excessive, their remedy is to make a reprisal to that
portion of the other country's reprisal which is considered to be exces-
sive. This type of procedure creates the possibility of escalation.
The standards imposed upon the Commission by section 19*with re-
gard to retorsions are more stringent than the international standards.
Under international law, there is no requirement that retorsions be pro-
portional since the retorsion is a legal act. However, section 19 requires
that both retorsions and reprisals be proportionate.
A further requirement of section 19 is that the conditions be "un-
favorable to shipping in the foreign trade, whether in any particular
trade or upon any particular route or in commerce generally, . . ,56
Therefore, before regulations to achieve redress or balance grievances
under section 19 may be issued, a finding must be made that unfavor-
able conditions do exist.5 7 Regulations may not be issued based upon
speculation, probability, or in anticipation of conditions unfavorable to
shipping in the foreign trade. An understanding of section 19 therefore
requires an understanding of what is meant by "shipping."
In common usage, "shipping" would refer to the transportation of
goods by many different means. But, in the context of the Merchant
Marine Act (1920), "shipping" must clearly refer to transportation by
ocean-going vessels. Unlike the Shipping Act of 1916, the application of
section 19 is not limited to regular liner service or service by a conference,
but also includes service by vessels known as tramps.58 The term "ship-
ping" encompasses more than vessels since it refers to the whole trans-
portation service performed by the merchant marine. The interests of the
United States are not limited to the operation of U. S. flag vessels but ex-
tend to the efficiency, availability, economy, and reliability of the trans-
portation of U. S. import and export commerce by the whole merchant
marine industry. While the protection of the equality of opportunity of
U. S. flag vessels to fairly compete is a primary function of section 19, it
is not its only function.
For example, if a U. S. exporting industry relies on a specialized
service offered only by vessels owned and operated by the citizens of a
foreign country, would not the actions of a foreign government which
would eliminate or reduce those services be detrimental to shipping?
In such a situation, the effect upon the transportation service, and not
54 A procedure as was agreed to in the Nauliaa Case, supra note 30.
55 See, Hudec, Retaliation Against Unreasonable Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section
301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REv. 461 (1975).
56 46 U.S.C. §876 (1970).
57 Grace Line, 7 F.M.C. 432 (1962).
58 Section 19 Investigation, 1 U.S. Ship. Bd. Bur. 470, 498 (1935).
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the flag of the vessel, is the determining factor. Conditions affecting
shipping should be defined as conditions which affect: (1) U. S. flag ves-
sels; (2) vessels calling at United States ports; or, (3) vessels used for the
transportation of commerce of the United States.5 9
"Foreign trade" is also a term which needs to be defined in the con-
text of section 19. The statute indicates its meaning by referring to "for-
eign trade, whether in any particular trade, or upon any particular route
or in commerce generally."' 60 Thus, it may be inferred that "foreign
trade," as used in section 19, has a more expansive meaning than "for-
eign trade" as defined by the Shipping Act of 1916 which limits use of
the term to transportation directly between ports in the United States and
ports in foreign countries.61
Commerce of the United States moves not only between U. S. and
foreign countries but also among foreign countries. Therefore, the ap-
plication of section 19 must also extend to transportation between foreign
ports. Under this application, shipping in foreign trade would be prop-
erly defined as all shipping which is not in interstate or intrastate com-
merce. Making commerce between foreign ports subject to the regula-
tory scheme of section 19 is consistent with the scope of section 26 of the
Shipping Act of 1916 which expressly covers transportation of goods in
U. S. vessels between foreign countries. 62
The conditions which may be adjusted or met are conditions which
"arise out of or- result from foreign laws, rules, or regulations or from
competitive methods or practice employed by owners, operators, agents
or masters of vessels of a foreign country. '63 Fortunately, regulations
have never been promulgated to adjust or meet conditions arising out
of or resulting from foreign laws. Only rarely have such regulations even
been proposed.
The first regulations were not proposed until 1959. At that time, the
Republic of Ecuador began to levy a consular fee equal to 81/2 per cent of
the f.o.b. value of goods imported on Ecuadorian national lines or on
lines associated with Ecuadorian national lines. In contrast, a 912 per
cent consular fee was levied on goods shipped on lines which were
neither Ecuadorian nor associated with Ecuadorian lines. 64 Regulations
were proposed by the Federal Maritime Board which would have levied
an equalizing charge of one per cent on goods carried on the Ecuadorian
59 See R. DE KERCHOVE, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DIRECTORY (2d ed. 1961).
60 46 U.S.C. § 876 (1970).
61 Section 1 of the Shipping Act, 1916, defines shipping in the foreign commerce as
. between the United States or any of its Districts, Territories, or possessions and a
foreign country . . ." 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1970).
62 46 U.S.C. § 825 (1970). See text accompanying note 38, supra.
63 46 U.S.C. § 876 (1970).
64 24 Fed. Reg. 5422 (1959).
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lines or on carriers associated with Ecuadorian lines. 65 But the regula-
tions were never adopted because the consular fees were equalized be-
fore the regulations became effective.
In 1961, the staff of the Federal Maritime Board prepared regulations
to counteract discriminatory practices of the government of Chile. De-
crees had been passed which reserved to the national flag vessels of Chile
"50 per cent of the maritime transportation of cargo, both import and
export, between Chile and the countries served." '66 A ten per cent
penalty of the c.i.f. value of the cargo shipped on non-Chilean vessels or
non-Chilean associated vessels was used to carry out the decrees. The
staff countered by preparing an offsetting regulation which would have
imposed an equalizing charge of ten per cent of the c.i.f. value of cargoes
shipped on Chilean vessels or on vessels associated with Chilean lines.
67
The regulations prepared by the staff were forwarded to the Department
of State so that the Government of Chile could be informed of the type of
countervailing regulations the Federal Maritime Board might promul-
gate. However, a compromise between U. S. and Chilean carriers
negated the discriminatory effects of the Chilean Decrees before the Fed-
eral Maritime Board acted on the regulations.
In 1961, the Federal Maritime Board also proposed the issuance of
regulations which would have adjusted or met conditions created by the
laws of the government of Venezuela. Decrees provided for "total or
partial exoneration of import duties when transported on the Venezue-
lan national lines or line associated therewith. 68 A countervailing regu-
lation would have imposed an equalizing charge of fifty per cent of the
revenue accrued b the Venezuelan lines or the Venezuelan associated
lines in excess of their relative percentage of the trade as determined by
a base period. 69 Again, the regulation was not adopted because a com-
promise was reached by U. S. carriers which eliminated the discrimina-
tory effect of the Venezuelan law.
In 1963, the Federal Maritime Commission proposed regulations to
countervail conditions created by law of the government of Uruguay.70
Preferences had been established for goods shipped on Uruguayan na-
tional vessels by a decree dated June 13, 1963, which provided:
(a) Articles, merchandise, products and goods imported in national
flag dry cargo ships shall be exonerated from 50% of the surcharge es-
tablished by Article I of the Decree dated April 14, 1963. (This surcharge
amounts to 20% C.I.F. value.)
65 Id.
66 Unpublished draft regulations of the Federal Maritime Board.
67 Id.
68 Alcoa Steamship Co., 7 F.M.C. 345, 376 (1962).
69 Id.
70 29 Fed. Reg. 16195 (1964).
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(b) Articles, merchandise, products and goods not subject to sur-
charge and included within the provisions of Article V of Law 12670 of
December 17, 1959, shall be exempted from the 6% tax on transfer of
funds abroad established by Article VI of Law 11924 of March 27, 1953,
when they are imported in national flag dry cargo ships.71
In order to adjust or meet the conditions imposed by the laws of the gov-
ernment of Uruguay, the Federal Maritime Commission passed a regu-
lation which stated:
the owner or operator of each favored vessel carrying exports between
the United States and Uruguary shall be subject, in so far as goods cov-
ered by Article I of the Decree of April 14, 1963 are concerned, to an
equalizing charge of 10% of the c.i.f. value of all such cargoes covered.
On the cargoes which are covered by the provisions of Article V of Law
12670 of December 17, 1959, an equalizing charge of 6% of the c.i.f.
value shall be assessed .... 72
But while the Federal Maritime Commission was in the process of issu-
ing these regulations, the government of Uruguary increased the sur-
charge from 20 to 30 per cent. 73 The Federal Maritime Commission count-
ered by increasing the equalizing charge from 10 to 15 per cent of the
c.i.f. value on goods covered by the new Uruguayan decree. These regu-
lations were to go into effect on January 4, 1965. 7 - However, on January
4, 1965, the Commission suspended the effective date of those regula-
tions because the government of Uruguay communicated that it was sub-
mitting a proposal to its Parliament for a new merchant marine law de-
signed to promote and support their merchant marine fleet without re-
liance on measures which discriminated against United States vessels.76
It is interesting to note that all of these cases involved laws which
directly affected shippers rather than carriers. By making it cheaper to
transport goods on national lines because of lower import, excise, sur-
charge, or even income taxes, cargo can be artificially diverted to na-
tional flag carriers. A proliferation of these inventive diversions
prompted the Federal Maritime Commission to put foreign governments
on notice that laws which:
(a) Impose upon vessels in the foreign trade of the United States
fees, charges, requirements, or restrictions different from those im-
posed on other vessels competing in the trade, or which preclude or
tend to preclude vessels in the foreign trade of the United States from
competing in the trade on the same basis as any other vessel;
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 29 Fed. Reg. 17121 (1964).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 30 Fed. Reg. 35 (1965).
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(b) Reserve substantial cargoes to the national flag or other vessels
and fail to provide, on reasonable terms, for effective and equal access
to such cargo by vessels in the foreign trade of the United States;
(c) Are otherwise unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade of
the United States;
(d) Are discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers,
exporters, importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United
States and their foreign competitors and which cannot be justified
under generally-accepted international agreements or practices and
which operate to the detriment of the foreign commerce or the public
interest of the United States;77
are unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade of the United States.
Section 19 applies to conditions other than those resulting from for-
eign laws. Conditions which arise out of or result from "competitive
methods or practices employed by owners, operators, agents, or masters
of vessels of a foreign country; ' 78 may also be countervailed. This aspect
of section 19 has been used only to countervail two kinds of conditions.
In a Section 19 Investigation, the Shipping Board found,
the following practices are hereby specifically condemned as unfair and
detrimental to the commerce of the United States and the development
of an adequate merchant marine:
1. The solicitation or procurement of freight by offers to underquote
any rate which another carrier or carriers may quote.
2. The use of rate cutting as a club to compel other carrier to adopt
pooling agreements, rate differentials, spacing of sailing agreement or
other measures. 79
These findings were followed with regard to the underquoting of
rates in the case of Cargo to Adriatic, Black Sea, and Levant Ports.8 0 They
were also followed in the case of Rates, Charges, and Practices of Yamashita
Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha and Syosen Kabwsiki Kaisya involving a foreign
carrier quoting rates based on abnormal factors which made them dif-
ferentially lower than those of other carriers in the trade.8 1 However,
there may be some doubt as to the current applicability of these holdings.
In 1935, when the Section 19 Investigation was reported, carriers were
not required to publish or post their rates. Rates on a commodity could
be changed by the minute. A non-conference carrier could always main-
tain lower rates than a conference carrier by simply telling a shipper that
he would create a new rate at a certain percentage lower than any rate
that the conference carrier would quote.8 2 Not only did this practice
77 46 C.F.R. § 506.3 (1975).
78 46 U.S.C. § 876 (1970).
79 1 U.S. Ship. Bd. Bur. 470, 498 (1935).
80 2 U.S. Mar. Comm. 342 (1940).
81 2 U.S. Mar. Comm. 14 (1939).
82 1 U.S. Ship. Bd. Bur. 470, 475 (1935).
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make it difficult for the conference carrier to compete on the basis of rates
because they could not find out what the competitor's rates were, but
also made it too hard for the conference carrier to meet the non-confer-
ence rates because of the differential. Consequently, the Shipping Board
proposed rules and regulations to "require complete rate publicity in a
manner that will afford equal opportunity for all shippers to avail them-
selves of such rates and full opportunity to competing carriers to meet
such rates . ."83
Some of the stigma which the Shipping Board attached to differ-
ential rates was removed by the Federal Maritime Board when it held
that the practice of citing rates proportionately lower than conference
rates was not illegal per se. 84 Furthermore, the conditions which made
differentials so pernicious were removed by amendments to section 18
of the Shipping Act of 1916.85 The amendments prohibit common car-
riers by water in the foreign commerce of the United States from charging
or receiving a greater, less, or different rate of compensation for the
transportation of property than specified in their tariffs that must be
filed with the Commission in order to be given effect. 86 Moreover, the
grant of rule-making authority to adjust or meet conditions created by
foreign shipowners and operators appears to be out of place in this sec-
tion on retaliatory powers.
Perhaps it would be best to interpret this grant of rule-making
power against foreign shipowners and operators as acts which take place
outside the legislative jurisdiction of the United States. For example, the
acts of a foreign carrier to shut a U.S. carrier out of a foreign - to - foreign
trade route would not be within the legislative competence of the United
States. But the power to control transit of those foreign carriers in and out
of the territorial waters of the United States could be used to obtain fair
treatment for U.S. carriers. This interpretation would make the scope of
section 19(1)(b) strictly one of retaliation and would leave the acts of
foreign shipowners and operators which are otherwise within the legis-
lative competence of the United States subject only to the substantive
provisions of the Shipping Act of 191687 and other relevant statues.
The final qualification on the issuance of rules or regulations under
section 19 is that they must not be "in conflict with law."88 The law of the
United States comes from many sources including international law. 89
Under the law of nations, remonstrance, refusal, and proportionality
83 Id. at 498.
8 Anglo Canadian Shipping Co. v. Mitsui Steamship Co., 4 F.M.B. 535, 542 (1955).
85 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(1970), amending 46 U.S.C. § 817 (1964).
86 46 U.S.C. § 817(b) (1970).
87 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1970).
88 46 U.S.C. § 876 (1970).
89 The Neteide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815).
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are necessary components of reprisals. But there are no such restraints on
the use of retorsions. 90 Section 26 of the Shipping Act of 1916, 91 the pre-
decessor to section 19, requires remonstrance and refusal to precede a
recommendation by the President for Congress to take action. 92 Con-
gress, if it chooses to enact a reprisal, is constrained to act proportionally
only in so far as it desires to adhere to international law. In contrast, regu-
lations promulgated under section 19 must be enacted for the purpose of
adjusting or meeting conditions unfavorable to shipping. Therefore, any
retorsion or reprisal issued pursuant thereto must be proportional. How-
ever, there is no express requirement that remonstrance and refusal pre-
cede promulgation of any regulations under section 19. But since all
regulations issued under section 19 must be consistent with law and
since international law is considered to be a part of the law of the United
States, any reprisal enacted under section 19 must be preceded by both
remonstrance and refusal.
On the other hand, there is no requirement under international law
that retorsions be preceded by either remonstrance or refusal. Neverthe-
less, the Commission has made it a policy to notify the Secretary of State
when it appears that conditions unfavorable to shipping in the foreign
trade may exist. 93 In certain circumstances, the Commission may also
ask the Secretary of State to seek a diplomatic solution by a specified
date.94 Regulations which amount to retorsions will, therefore, always
be preceded by some form of notice to the foreign country through the
Secretary of State. The Commission is not required to wait for diplomatic
solution or formal refusal hefore issuing a retorsion.
The "not in conflict with law" requirement also raises the question
of whether the issuance of a reprisal is thereby prohibited. An act of
reprisal, which ordinarily would be in violation of international law,
may be internationally lawful when in retaliation for a violation of inter-
national law. 95 Therefore, regulations otherwise properly enacted by the
Commission under section 19 are not "in conflict with law" because they
constitute acts of reprisal.
The procedures set up by the Commission for the issuance of regu-
lations under section 19 are fairly straightforward. 96 The procedure may
be initiated by petition or a motion by the Commission. 97 If initiated
by petition, relevant statistics and information must be provided show-
90 See text accompanying note 10, supra.
91 46 U.S.C. § 825 (1970).
92 See text accompanying note 39, supra.
93 46 C.F.R. § 506.8 (1975).
94 Id.
9- See text accompanying note 15, supra.
- 46 C.F.R. § 506 (1975).
97 46 C.F.R. § 506.5 (1975).
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ing the effects of the complained law or practice. 98 The petitioner must
also request his remedy in the form of a proposed regulation.99 If it ap-
pears that conditions unfavorable to shippers may exist, the Secretary of
State is notified. 100 The Commission then must determine if conditions
unfavorable to shipping exist. If they do, appropriate countervailing
regulations are considered. Depending upon the circumstances, these
determinations may be before or after notice and hearing. 1' 1 In situa-
tions where there are serious dislocations of trade caused by discrimina-
tory laws, the Commission must be able to promulgate countervailing
regulations quickly before extensive damage to carriers or permanent
diversions of carriage occur. In less urgent situations, interested parties
should be granted notice and hearing.
The most difficult decision the Commission must make in issuing
regulations under section 19 is the policy decision concerning whether
countervailing regulations should be promulgated. Even if conditions
unfavorable to the foreign trade are found to exist, the Commission has
the discretion to decide not to issue regulations. 0 2 This decision is dif-
ficult because most of the laws which create conditions unfavorable to
shipping are not enacted with the intent of harming the vessels or the
commerce of the United States but are intended to foster the growth of
foreign merchant marines.
The United States finds its conduct in this regard not much different
from other countries. The United States has determined that there are
benefits from the maintenance of a viable merchant marine which must
be considered against the benefits of competition in a free trade inter-
national economy. For instance, the United States supplements the com-
petitive capacity of its own merchant marine by grants of construction
differential subsidies 10 3 and operating differential subsidies. 1°4 A for-
eign trading partner would be perfectly justified, if not engaging in the
same or similar conduct, in imposing an offsetting fee on U.S. vessels
receiving such subsidies. The lack of any countervailing fees against
U.S. vessels and the weak posture of the U.S. merchant marine attest
to the fact that differential subsidies do not actually divert the carriage of
trade to a significant extent. The subsidies merely enable the United
States to maintain an acceptable minimum level of participation in the
carnage.
98 46 C.F.R. § 506.6 (1975),
- 46 C.F.R. § 506.6(e) (1975).
100 46 C.F.R. § 506.3 (1975).
101 46 C.F.R. § 506.10 (1975).
102 c.f. Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Federal Maritime Commission, 321 F.2d 756, 761 (D.C.
Cir. 1963).
103 Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
104 46 U.S.C. § 1171 (1970).
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When the Federal Maritime Commission is faced with a foreign law
which creates conditions unfavorable to shipping, it must consider that
both the United States and its trading partners desire the maximum ef-
ficiency, economy, quality, and availability of service along with
maximum participation in the carriage. Many countries, particularly the
developing ones, consider the degree of participation susceptible to
formulas. A forty per cent participation of the trade has been put forward
as the minimum to which every country is entitled. 105 Many developing
countries, as well as the United States, have rejected this approach as too
rigid and as lacking in consideration of other important benefits derived
from competition, such as efficiency, economy, and quality of service. 106
At present, there is no international consensus as to the degree of par-
ticipation in carriage to which a country is entitled in its foreign trade,
except to the extent that each country is due a significant percentage.
Until a consensus is reached, the Federal Maritime Commission must
consider that each country is entitled to a significant share of the carriage
of its trade as long as efficiency, economy, quality, and availability of
service are not unduly harmed. Therefore, a set solution for all cases of
direct and indirect trade diversions is not possible because all the rele-
vant factors in each case have to be considered.
If the retaliatory powers of section 19 are to be implemented suc-
cessfully, the powers of retaliation cannot be used to frustrate absolutely
the development of merchant marines in foreign countries. The funda-
mental purpose of retaliation is to deter the abuse of the right of a foreign
country to control its foreign commerce. If retaliation in the form of con-
trols on the foreign commerce of the United States becomes abusive, then
the retaliation will become counterproductive as a deterrent. Certainly
other nations would regard the frequent use of section 19 to frustrate all
efforts to develop their domestic merchant marine fleets as an abuse of
the power by the United States. This would be viewed as unacceptable
interference with foreign commerce of other nations.
Fortunately, the Federal Maritime Commission fully appreciates
these considerations. The absence of any final enactment of regulations
under section 19 attests to the prudent employment of section 19. That
is not to say that the retaliatory powers of section 19 are not necessary.
Quite to the contrary, the experiences of the Commission with the gov-
ernments of Ecuador, Chile, Venezuela and Uruguay demonstrate that
the ability to retaliate is necessary for the resolution of some interna-
tional trade conflicts.
Generally, the power of retaliation appears necessary as a sovereign
right in international law for the protection of international commerce,
103 See Comment, The Liner Conference Converntion: Launching an International Regu-
latory Regime, 6 L & POL. INT'L Bus. (1974).
106 Id. at 533.
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particularly in international shipping, to lessen the influences of na-
tionalism. The successful use of power to retaliate depends upon the ad-
herence to the principles of remonstrance, refusal and proportionality,
tempered by a sophisticated appreciation of the commerce involved and
the needs and aspirations of the countries concerned.
